Constructing migrants as crime and public order problems
Comparing local press representations in two Italian cities

Anna Di Ronco and Anita Lavorgna

Introduction

The presence of sanguinary civil wars and religious and separatist conflicts afflicting several countries in the Middle East and northern Africa has led, especially over the past five years, to what has been called in Europe as the ‘refugee crisis’, with southern European countries daily receiving increasing numbers of re-settlers. It was estimated that over one million people – refugees, displaced persons and other migrants – have made their way to the EU in 2015; more than 350,000 arrived via the Mediterranean Sea in 2016 alone, and about 60,000 in the first half of 2017 (European Commission, 2017; UNHCR, 2017). Those arriving via sea are split almost evenly between Italy and Greece, with smaller numbers arriving in Malta, Cyprus, and Spain (IOM, 2017).

The arrival of migrants in southern European countries and their relocation to other European Member States has often raised concerns and sparked the protests of sections of the population. As a result, in many EU countries tighter control systems have been introduced against the allegedly risk-posing ‘non-citizens’: namely undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. In Italy, these control systems have mostly relied on

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administrative, rather than on criminal, measures, and have been included in both security (public order) and migration control policies.

In Italy, right-wing political parties (particularly, but not limited to, the Northern League) have raised concerns over the arrival and presence of refugees and, more in general, migrants in Italian cities, often using a racist and xenophobic language that has legitimised ‘local policies of exclusion’ (Ambrosini and Caneva, 2012; Caneva, 2014). As will be detailed in the next section, these policies or public order regulations have been used by local authorities to administratively sanction and ban from public spaces all behaviour considered to be a ‘threat’ to the safety and security of citizens, including begging, illegal settlements in public spaces (Roma people), the selling and purchasing of alcoholic beverages and the presence of street prostitutes in certain city areas. In practice, however, these punitive regulations have mostly been applied against migrants (Caneva, 2014; Crocitti and Selmini, 2016), particularly Roma people and street sex workers (who in Italy are mostly migrants; for more see Di Ronco, 2017).

Research has highlighted that there are differences in the local enforcement of these public order regulations (Di Ronco, 2014, 2016) and that these differences are also related to the specific political parties entrusted with the local governance (Devroe et al., 2016). The use of onerous administrative or civil measures, which substantially restrict individual’s autonomy and de facto criminalise an individual’s behaviour and exclude unwanted and already marginalised groups from public spaces (which has occurred not only in Italy but also in other European countries, see Peršak, 2017a), has been viewed as an example of popular punitiveness and protection of the public from feeling negative emotions (Peršak, 2017b). This misuse of measures has also been interpreted as a feature of the pre-crime society (Pleysier, 2015, 2017) and of Garland’s (2001) ‘culture of control’ (Devroe, 2012; Devroe et al., 2016).

Another broadly used control system (harshly criticised as contravening international human rights standards) is administrative detention – that is, the practice of detaining migrants for administrative purposes, such as to establish their identities, or to facilitate their immigration claims resolution or their removal (for a comparative study of the refugee detention systems in the US, UK, Italy, France and Germany, see Welch and Shuster, 2005). These detention systems have been studied in migration (Cinalli and El Hariri, 2011) and in the so-called ‘crimmigration’ literature (Guia et al., 2017).
2011; Van der Woude et al., 2017), and have been analysed through Garland’s (2001) ‘culture of control’ and Simon’s (2007) ‘governing through crime’ theoretical frameworks (see, among others, Welch and Shuster, 2005; Bosworth, 2008; Bosworth and Guild, 2008). Within the crimmigration literature, studies have emphasised the importance of the local context in the understanding of migration control and, consequently, the (informal) inclusion or exclusion of migrants by the action of criminal justice actors (Fabini, 2017).

National as well as local punitive policy responses towards unwanted minorities also depend on the media representations of the ‘problems’ to be addressed (Chibnall, 1977; Hall, 1982; Ericson et al., 1991). According to a recent comparative study (Berry et al., 2015), for instance, asylum seekers and refugees have been represented differently in Italian, Spanish, British and Swedish press outlets in 2014 and 2015. While the Swedish press has offered the most favourable and positive portrayal of asylum seekers and refugees, the British press has described them in the most negative terms: as a threat to the welfare and health systems (‘bogus’) and as criminals (Berry et al., 2015). Labelling asylum seekers and refugees as bogus and illegal facilitated a vicious circle of criminalisation (leading, for example, to their detention and electronic monitoring – which helped to reaffirm the idea that migrants are criminals) (Cooper, 2009). In the study of Berry and colleagues (2015), the Italian press produced mixed results: it included humanitarian themes along with negative frames, which are to be explained through the hostility and anti-migrant sentiments that since long have been promoted by politicians through the media, also with the use of stigmatising language and labels such as ‘clandestine’, ‘illegals’ etc. (Montaly et al., 2013; Quassoli, 2013).

These studies focused on the national press and offered, therefore, a national level of analysis. As suggested in the crimmigration literature, however, local approaches to (irregular) migrants may substantially vary across space and, in particular, in different local contexts. In addition to that, fear of crime and feelings of insecurity (which may, to an extent, be shared by people in Western societies and epitomise larger social anxieties) also very much vary in different local contexts (Girling et al., 2000; Jewkes, 2015) and may reflect the ideologies and discourses of the political parties running the city. In other words, the extent to which national punitive regulations are implemented and enforced in a certain local context
may reflect local (political) narratives on the “problems” posed by migrants, which are also voiced by local politicians (among other actors) through the local media.

The aim of this chapter is to inspect how the local press have framed the ‘problems’ associated with the increased presence of undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in two Italian cities, Padova and Udine, which have been run by different political parties: right-wing (Padova) and centre-left (Udine) parties. Ultimately, it aims to inspect whether there are similarities or differences in how the local press in these two cities has constructed the ‘problems’ posed by, and the solutions against, migrants at the local level.

Background: regulating asylum seekers and undocumented migrants in Italy

Before moving to the media analysis, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the complex Italian hosting system and the asylum claim process, and of the two main administrative control systems available in Italy to deal with the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ – i.e., administrative detention and public order measures (the latter take, in practice, the form of administrative fines).

2 In late September 2018, the Italian government has approved a new “security Decree” (which has to be converted into law by the Parliament within 60 day to retain its legal validity). This Decree would reduce the possibilities of issuing residence permits to migrants for humanitarian reasons, and enlarge the types of crimes for which humanitarian protection is revoked or denied, leading to migrants’ deportation. These crimes are, among others, intimidation of a public officer, serious physical violence, and theft and burglary aggravated by the use of weapons or by the use of drugs by the perpetrator. It worth noting that, according to the new legislation, when a person is merely prosecuted (not convicted or found guilty) for one of these crimes, the asylum application can be blocked and the person immediately repatriated. This provision, as many commenters have already suggested, is in breach of the presumption of innocence, which is crystallised in the Italian Constitution (art. 27). The Decree also revokes citizenship to people convicted for terrorism. In addition, it authorises the local police (usually unarmed) to use taser guns and the police to access data bases; allows urban DASPOs (see the section of this chapter on public order measures) to be applied in healthcare facilities, markets and public
The hosting system and the asylum claim process

Migrants and asylum seekers arriving in Italy are subject to a twofold hosting process. In the primary hosting phase (‘prima accoglienza’), migrants are gathered in Reception Centres (CDAs) and Hotspots, where they are identified and divided into those who have to be repatriated as economic migrants and those with a right to apply for asylum. At least on paper, those with a right to apply for asylum should be transferred to Regional Hubs (which since 2015 have replaced the so-called Hosting Centres for Asylum Seekers or CARAs). Those who have to be repatriated should be moved to the so-called Identification and Expulsion Centres (CIEs), soon to be renamed Centers for Residence and Repatriation (CPR, see below for further details).

The asylum claim starts in the primary hosting phase either with a request at the border police office, or with the formal registration (including fingerprinting and photographing) at the Questura (provincial Police station). Police authorities of the Questura ask the asylum seeker questions related to the Dublin III Regulation and then contact the Dublin Unit of the Ministry of the Interior to verify whether Italy is responsible for the examination of the asylum application. Police authorities cannot examine the merits of the asylum application, but they send the registration form and all the relevant documents to the Territorial Commissions for International Protection, which are competent for the substantive asylum interview.

In the secondary hosting phase (‘seconda accoglienza’), refugees and asylum seekers are moved into the Protection Systems for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRARs) while waiting for a decision on their claim. In the SPRARs, asylum seekers and refugees should benefit from ad-hoc programs to facilitate their integration (such as Italian language courses and vocational education programs). Unfortunately, SPRARs are often unable to provide sufficient room for the high numbers of applicants, so that many events; and sanctions squatting more harshly (with detention to up to four years and an administrative fine to be determined by the judge).

3 The so-called ‘hotspots’, according to the approach developed by the EU Commission, are the facilities set up at the EU’s external border in Italy (in Taranto, Trapani, Pozzallo and Lampedusa) and Greece for the initial reception, identification and registration of migrants coming by sea.
migrants are moved to the Extra Hosting Centres (CASs, similar to the Hubs) instead.

**Administrative detention**

In the Italian hosting system for migrants there are a number of administrative detention centres, originating from both Italian regulations and EU Directives that were only briefly mentioned in the previous section. This section aims at problematising the existence of the most controversial of these centers (those for identification and expulsion), and providing the necessary context to understand their development.

Immigration became an increasingly politicised issue from the late 1980s, when Italy (historically a country of emigration) started to become a country of immigration. In 1998, the 40/1998 Immigration Act (‘Turco-Napolitano Act’, after the names of the then Minister of Social Affairs Livia Turco and Minister of Interior Giorgio Napolitano) established, among others, an administrative immigration detention regime for irregular migrants who were to be identified before being expelled. The so-called Temporary Permanence Centres (CPTs), renamed in 2008 as Identification and Expulsion Centres (or CIEs) were regulated by the Prefectures (local divisions of the Ministry of Interior) and managed by private bodies funded with public money (initially, the Italian Red Cross and, currently, NGOs). CIEs, which were developed as an ‘emergency’ response, were criticised for grounds of unconstitutionality since their very inception, and especially after their regime was made harsher with the Immigration Act 189/2002 (‘Bossi-Fini’) under Silvio Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition, and further amended by the so-called ‘Security Package’ (Law Decree 92/2008, converted into Law 125/2008), Act 94/2009 and Decree 129/2011 (implementing Directive 2008/115/EC on returning illegally staying third-country nationals) (Sabatini, 2002; Vassallo Paleologo, 2010; Commissione Straordinaria per la Tutela e la Promozione dei Diritti Umani, 2016).

Administrative detention and, essentially, penal restrictions in the CIEs were not based on the commission of a crime and imposed by a court at the end of a criminal proceeding (formally there are not ‘inmates’, but ‘guests’ [sic]). Rather, they were imposed by the Questore (the chief of the provincial Police) and validated by a specialised judge with a deportation order or with a refused entry (Colombo, 2013). However, not all migrants who
were refused entry or were given a deportation order were detained in the CIEs, mostly because of their growing limited capacities. As contended by Colombo (2013), a crucial role in the decision on whether to detain a migrant in a CIE was played by the police: among the considered criteria, there were the availability of beds, the likelihood of being repatriated, and previous criminal convictions. Initially, there were 13 CIEs (hosting about 2,000 people), but were then formally reduced to five (in Roma, Caltanissetta, Bari, Torino, and Trapani), and could formally host a total of about 550 people. However, additional temporary CIEs were created to respond to specific crisis (such as in Libya) leading to increasing numbers of refugees, so that the actual number of CIEs swung often between 7 and 13, hosting about 1,000 people.

This legal framework for the regulation of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants was changed in 2017 by a governmental Decree – the so-called ‘Minniti-Orlando’, after the names of the then Ministry of the Interiors Marco Minniti and the Ministry of Justice Andrea Orlando, in Premier Paolo Gentiloni’s cabinet – on immigration and asylum (DL 13/2017), approved by the Italian Parliament on 12 April 2017. The Decree had the explicit aim to hasten the appeal procedures for asylum seekers, whose number severely increased over the last couple of years, causing severe delays in the (already clogged) Italian court system. Unfortunately, the Decree left the previous legislative paradigm – international migration as an ‘emergency’ phenomenon to be repressed – unquestioned, and for this has been harshly criticised (Masera, 2017; Open Migration, 2017). In the name of simplifying judicial procedures and easing the burden of the reception system, asylum seekers will no longer have the chance to appeal in the second instance against the rejection of their claims. Furthermore, the examination phase changed from a summary proceeding to a full chamber proceeding, eliminating the need for a hearing; the judge will be now provided with a video recording of the asylum seeker’s interview before the Territorial Commission, and will be able to hear the claimant in person only at his/her discretion. These procedural changes have been harshly criticised by the oppositions and civil society groups (Antigone, 2017; ASGI, 2017; Open Migration, 2017). In addition, specialised sections in courts will be dedicated to asylum claims and deportations.

The CIEs will be renamed Centers for Residence and Repatriation (CPRs); their number will be expanded from 4 to 20 throughout Italy, and
their total capacity increased to 1,600 places. The CPRs will be smaller (not more than 100 persons each) and better managed than the CIEs, and they will have the clear purpose of repatriation (rather than reception). Some technical provisions of the Decree are expected to limit the right to asylum. For instance, the creation of a list of ‘safe’ origin and transit countries would probably imply that, if a person has transited through, or comes from, a ‘safe’ country (such as Turkey), the claimant has a very slim chance of being granted asylum (ASGI, 2017).

Public order measures

In 2008, when the so-called ‘Security Package’ (see above) was passed by the then Berlusconi government, local authorities have been allowed to sanction administratively any behaviour deemed to threaten public safety and security. Since then, local authorities, especially in the northern part of Italy (Cittalia, 2012), have substantially used this power to target a wide range of ‘threatening’ or, simply, uncivil behaviour, including begging, public drinking and drunkeness, vandalism, street prostitution (especially sex workers’ ‘indecent’ clothing, see Di Ronco, 2017), littering, and noise nuisance (Cittalia, 2009, 2012). A recent study (Crocitti and Selmini, 2016) has suggested that, although not explicitly, these local regulations have mostly targeted migrants, as beggars, street sex workers, squeegee merchants etc. tend not to be of Italian nationality (see also Caneva, 2014).

The ‘Security Package’ and local security regulations have been negatively assessed by the Constitutional Court in one of its leading judgments of 2011 (of 7 April, No 115). In this ruling, the Court found that national and local security regulations breached a number of constitutional principles, including the principles of legality and proportionality. In essence, the prohibited conduct was not clearly identified by the law (in violation of the legality principle), thus allowing local actors to virtually penalise any behaviour considered problematic or threatening people’s security with excessive measures (in breach of the proportionality principle). According to the Court, the penalisation of both harmful (and in many cases already criminalised behaviour, such as vandalism, which is often punished through the offence of criminal damage) and harmless conduct (such as the hanging about of young people on the streets, which may be harmless but
considered as alarming by some powerful social groups) resulted in an excessive and disproportionate interference with the exercise of individual’s rights. To realign the law to these fundamental constitutional principles, the Court ‘corrected’ the exercise of local public order powers: it allowed local authorities to adopt (temporary-limited) regulations only in exceptional cases of serious and concrete risks of harm to the public safety and security of people (Di Ronco and Peršak, 2014). Notwithstanding this judgment, local authorities have carried on issuing (illegitimate) local security orders (Caneva, 2014; Di Ronco and Peršak, 2014; Crocitti and Selmini, 2016).

To make things worse, broad local public order powers have recently been re-introduced by the Italian government through the recent Law Decree 14/2017, which has been approved on the same day as the ‘Minniti-Orlando’ decree referred to above and has the same nickname (‘Minniti’). The Decree, which violates the Constitutional Court’s ruling, allows municipalities to, among others, adopt orders to protect the ‘decorum’, the ‘urban liveability’ and the “peace and quiet of residents” (art. 8 co. 1 lett. a no 1), and to prevent behaviour that “favours the occurrence of criminal phenomena or illegality” (art. 8 co. 1 lett. B No 1). The use of very vague concepts in the Decree (such as ‘decorum’, ‘liveability’ etc.) may again lead to the penalisation of any possibly harmless yet unwanted behaviour, and, therefore, to excesses and abuses.

The Decree also gives the possibility to local authorities to ban people from certain city areas (mainly historical and touristic areas, and close to transport infrastructures) when they adopt behaviour that “impairs the access and use of those areas” by others (art. 9 co. 1). These orders are informally called ‘urban DASPOs’, as they resemble the bans from taking part to sport events (the “Divieto di Accedere alle manifestazioni Sportive” or DASPO) used to exclude hooligans from sports events. People can be banned from a certain area for 48 hours; however, their access in the area can be prohibited by the Questore to up to six months, when they reiterate the prohibited conduct and adopt a behaviour that “may cause a risk to security” (art. 10 co. 2). Of course, the risk carried by this ban is that it will mostly be applied against, and ultimately exclude, the most vulnerable segments of the population (Antigone, 2017).

This ‘urban DASPO’ is relevant to the scope of our analysis: suffice it to think that it was used in an operation that took place in the Milan Central
Station on 2 May 2017, when dozens of migrants who hover/live around the train station where dispersed and 52 of them were brought in the Questura for inspection. The operation was severely criticised by many (e.g., activists from the civil society) but also praised by several politicians, such as Matteo Salvini of the Northern League (who thanked “God, the police, the carabinieri [for the] clean-up of this people we do not need [and who] every day infest [the station]”) (La Repubblica, 2017b).

Methodology

In this study, we chose to focus on two Italian cities, Padova and Udine, which are two medium-size cities located in the northeast of Italy. Their districts are relatively comparable in terms of economies, and they have a similar and rather high share of non-Italian residents compared to the total population. In addition, both Padova and Udine have hosting centres in their territories and have also implemented a number of public order measures. In Padova, for instance, under Bitonci’s administration, a number of public orders were issued in 2014, 2015 and 2016 to forbid, among others, rough sleeping on public benches, entering in certain recreation grounds without children, begging, soliciting of and procuring for prostitution; they have also been issued to limit the opening hours of ‘Kebab shops’ in certain areas of the city (Padovanet, 2017). Udine adopted a local regulation to protect the urban ‘decorum’ by mostly targeting street sex workers, homeless people, drunk people and graffiti writers relatively recently (on 20 December 2016).

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4 The average income (taxable income for the purpose of the personal income-tax surcharge) in these two districts is € 21.155 and € 22.568, respectively (data from 2015, retrieved from www.comuni-italiani.it).

5 In the Udine district migrants account to 7.5% of the total population (tot.: 533.282), whereas in the Padova district they are 10% of the total population (tot.: 936.887). See www.comuni-italiani.it, as above.

Despite these similarities, these two cities strongly differ in terms of local politics. While Udine has firmly been under centre-left administrations since 2003, Padova has shifted over the last decade between centre-left and right wing (namely the regionalist and xenophobic Northern League) administrations; after the fall of the City Council ruled by Massimo Bitonci from the Northern League in November 2016, it has been ruled by a prefectorial commissioner until November 2009. New elections were held in Spring 2017 and won by a centre-left coalition led by Sergio Giordani (after a run-off with Bitonci). It will be interesting to see whether this will entail new patterns in the relationship between local politics and media representation of refugees and security issues.

This study focuses on news articles published between 1 January, 2008 and 31 May, 2017. We decided to start our analysis in January 2008, the year of the ‘Security Package’, which introduces tough crimmigration and public disorder measures. The end date (31 May, 2017) is the latest possible date we could chose to complete the analysis.

The articles were extracted from the two most read newspapers in Padova and Udine, among the newspapers with a clear local focus which are *Il Mattino di Padova* and *Il Messaggero Veneto- Giornale del Friuli*, re-
spectively. Both newspapers used the same online platform for their digital archives, which allowed us to use the same keyword searches: “(rifugiato OR rifugiata OR rifugiati OR rifugiate OR profugo OR profuga OR profughe OR profughi) AND (sicurezza OR criminale OR illegale)”. We considered articles published both online and on paper. Other keywords combinations could have been used. However, we carried out a pilot search and concluded that the selected searches provided a good balance between relevance and inclusiveness.

After having manually sorted the files to exclude non-relevant news and duplicates (see Tables 1 & 2), a final sample of 252 articles was obtained: 152 were retrieved from Il Mattino di Padova (henceforth: MP) and 100 from Il Messaggero Veneto-Giornale del Friuli (henceforth: MV). It is worth noting that we considered relevant only the news focusing on the local ‘impact’ of migrants (which means that, for instance, articles on migration in general, articles on refugees moving to other European countries such as Germany, or articles on events occurring in neighbouring cities such as Venezia or Pordenone were not taken into consideration for the analysis).

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### Tables 1 and 2 – Keyword searches

**Il Mattino di Padova**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sicurezza</th>
<th>rifugiato (refugee – m)</th>
<th>rifugiata (refugee – f)</th>
<th>rifugiati (refugees – m)</th>
<th>rifugiati (refugees – f)</th>
<th>profugo (refugee – m)</th>
<th>profuga (refugee – f)</th>
<th>profughe (refugees – f)</th>
<th>profughi (refugees – m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>133 (23 relevant)</td>
<td>17 (0)</td>
<td>314 (24 relevant after excluding duplicates)</td>
<td>13(0)</td>
<td>91 (23 after excluding duplicates)</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
<td>1078 (72 after excluding duplicates)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>criminales</th>
<th>rifugiato</th>
<th>rifugiata</th>
<th>rifugiati</th>
<th>rifugiati</th>
<th>profugo</th>
<th>profuga</th>
<th>profughe</th>
<th>profughi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sicurezza</td>
<td>232 (11)</td>
<td>38 (0)</td>
<td>867 (30)</td>
<td>8(0)</td>
<td>133 (6)</td>
<td>10 (0)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
<td>2714 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criminales</td>
<td>44 (0)</td>
<td>3(0)</td>
<td>88(1)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
<td>11(0)</td>
<td>1(0)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
<td>138 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>illegale</td>
<td>41(0)</td>
<td>2(0)</td>
<td>81(2)</td>
<td>1(0)</td>
<td>11(0)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
<td>210 (7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The software NVivo was used for the computer-assisted qualitative and quantitative content analysis. Relevant passages in the text were categorised according to five main codes (‘Years’, ‘Actors speaking’, ‘Representations of migrants’, ‘Problems’, and ‘Solutions’) and 84 sub-codes. The use of NVivo allowed us to obtain descriptive statistics of the different codes and sub-codes: particularly, the number of references (that is, the number of text fragments within our sampled articles that have been coded with any code) provided us with insights into the recurrence of a certain theme in the press. The codes and sub-codes were also used to assist the
qualitative part of the analysis, the results of which are presented in the following section.

Our methodological approach has limitations that need to be acknowledged, both in terms of the sources and the analytical approach adopted. First, media sources do not paint a true or complete picture of the social world: media representations necessarily consist of viewpoints that succeed in capturing the attention of the general public (Barak, 1994). Second, content analysis has the inherent limitation that it relies on the researchers’ own categorisations and interpretation of the meaning of a text; as ambiguity is particularly frequent in media discourses and in sensitive topics, the replicability requirement is not clearly met (Krippendorff, 1980). Despite these limitations, media resources and content analysis are widely used in social sciences research, as they provide researchers with precious and rich information and representations of the social world.

**Results and discussion**

**Years**

The number of newspaper articles identified and analysed is overall rather scarce in the period of time stretching from 2008 to 2014, covering about one fifth of the total number of articles considered ($N = 252$). From 2015 onward, by contrast, relevant articles started to increase significantly and reached the highest number (86 references in total) in 2016. Please note that for the year 2017, when fifty news articles were sampled, only news released until 31 May were taken into consideration, thus suggesting that in 2017 the number of virtually all relevant items will likely surpass the number of relevant news sampled in 2016.

**Actors speaking**

The voices of political actors dominate the press discourse on migrants (50.7%). In particular, the press tends to cover the opinions of mayors (21.3%) and local politicians (17.3%), in addition to the regional (6.4%)
and national (5,3%) politicians. The voices of criminal justice actors – including the police (7,5%), the prefect (7,7%), the quaestor (3,3%) and judges (2,4%) – also substantially featured the local press debate on migrants (20,9%). In addition, residents and citizens are also given a voice (11,9%). Groups that speak infrequently in the news are religious representatives, groups and charities, who all try to get migrants integrated in the local communities (5,5%). Asylum seekers and refugees speak only in a very limited number of articles (1,75%) and, overall, less than their “victims” (or of the victims of crimes said to be committed by migrants) (2,6%). Experts’ opinions are virtually absent in the debate, as their voices appear in only one article where a university professor speaks, in line with Berry and colleagues (2015).

**Representations of migrants**

Migrants are mostly represented as criminals (45%) and bogus (15,7%). In a much limited number of articles, they are described as ‘illegal’ (‘clandestini’) (5,9%), dangerous as they allegedly carry highly infectious diseases such as scabies (5,9%), and as terrorists (4,9%). Migrants are portrayed in positive terms, *i.e.* not as criminals but as people fleeing from civil wars, only in a very small minority of articles (6,4%). This partly contradicts the results of the recent study carried out by Berry and colleagues (2015), which suggest that the Italian (national) press has presented negative frames about migrants along with more positive (mostly humanitarian) themes. This difference may have to do with the fact that in the study of Berry *et al.* (2015) the sampled newspapers were national and not local as in the present research, and that the local newspapers may tend to give more coverage to local events and to the messages of the most vocal local politicians, who often belong to right-wing political parties.

**Problems**

Both the two selected press outlets are consistent in describing the ‘refugee’ problem as an ‘emergency’. The emergency situation is particularly sensationalised in the news published in Udine: the Italian region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, where Udine is situated, is commonly referred to in the
news as the ‘Lampedusa of the North’ (MV, 10 October 2015). This analogy is used to emphasise the high number of migrants who daily arrive in the region, either by crossing the Slovenian border or by being relocated by the central state (after landing in Lampedusa and reaching the Italian southern regions by sea).

In the substantial majority of the news (31,6%), national and local refugee hosting policies are questioned. For example, policies are problematised and criticised because of the limited capacities of municipalities, which only can offer limited places in the (often old and unsuitable) allocated reception centres to host asylum seekers and refugees, and of law enforcers to deal with the situation (10,6%). Hosting policies are also challenged because of the link between the arrival and acceptance of asylum seekers and the occurrence of social disorder and crime (5%) (e.g., “These migrant flows increase delinquency”, MV, 17 June 2015). The already (perceived) excessive number of asylum seekers and refugees in the locality is also considered very problematic (4,3%), along with the limited information provided by municipalities to the citizens in relation to the number of hosted migrants and hosting modalities (1,6%), the overall perceived ineptitude of local politicians in dealing with the refugee crisis (0,7%), and the utilisation of perceived unsuitable or “special” spaces (e.g., with a cultural or historic relevance) as reception centres (0,5%). In addition, national policies are criticised as they are considered too ‘open’ and allow too many asylum seekers and refugees to be hosted in the country (3,2%). Refugee policies are also attacked as they are said to be serving individual’s economic and political interests, at the expenses of the community (3,4%).

While the two press outlets offer a similar negative portrayal of national and local refugee hosting policies, they substantially differ in the way they frame the main problems associated with the arrival and stay of migrants in the local communities.

In Udine, for example, asylum seekers and refugees are mostly described in terms of social and physical disorder (in short, as decay or, in Italian, ‘degrado’). Especially the unregistered or ‘irregular’ ones (such as the individuals who enter – or are trafficked in – the country through the Slovenian border, and ‘hang around’ without filing the asylum request by the competent authorities) are considered as a problem as they sleep rough in public parks and close by the train station (8,6%), simply hang about
(5.2%), engage in fights among each other (4.7%), and ‘pollute’ the areas they occupy (4.3%) (e.g., “They transformed the area into a latrine”, MV, 31 December 2016). The emphasis on the link between migrants and physical disorder is well exemplified in the following fragment: “They do not annoy us, but they scare us and make [the area] dirty” (MV, 24 May 2015). More in general, the presence of migrants seems to alarm people as refugees and asylum seekers are said to adopt uncivil behaviour:

“There are reported fights, gatherings of refugees under the covered walkway and in front of the shop windows, and most of all drug dealing in the open-air. [. . .] All this has created a strong sense of fear. People feel impotent in front of others’ rudeness. [. . .] This is a terrible defeat of [our] system of civilisation, law and order” (MV, 30 December 2016).

The representations of asylum seekers and refugees in Padova vary substantially, as they are mostly portrayed as criminals or as bogus. In many of the news, for example, asylum seekers and refugees are considered as ‘fake’ (MP, 9 August 2008): they are described as economic migrants, who are given more than what ‘the others’ – meaning the legitimate Italian citizens who pay taxes – get from the State. These representations are well exemplified in the fragment below, which describes migrants as fake, illegal, and welfare scroungers:

“The welcoming of alleged asylum-seekers is up to those who are accomplices of this invasion, and who are at the Government. I perceive my role [as mayor, a.n.] as a family man and, as such, I need to defend my family and I won’t use part of the scarce resources that the [national] Government leaves on our territory to support the illegal migrants who, according to Alfano and Renzi [national level politicians, a.n.], should make out a living on the shoulders and at the risk of our community. The pensioners and the pre-retired people trapped by the pension reform, the young couples, the unemployed, all the victims of the economic crisis and of three unelected governments, they all deserve security and respect” (MP, 15 April 2015).

When depicted as criminals (21% in total), migrants are mostly associated with drug dealing (6.3%), theft (2.1%), and, especially, with violence and sexual assault (7.5%), and sexual harassment (4.3%). When the press covers news on sexual harassment and assault (reporting a few episodes that have occurred in Padova), the victims (who are women) speak (e.g., “We
have been left alone at the mercy of a pervert”, MP, 24 March 2017). Narratives on the importance of protecting women (“we see scared and worried women, who need to be listened to and protected”, MP, 13 March 2017) and children (“But if they invade our streets and wander around to fill their time, it is difficult not to be worried. I have a daughter who does sport and she will have to spend time in public places, such as in the sports field”, MP, 14 September 2016; “I am scared for my two little sisters”, MP, 17 October 2015) are very typical.

In both press outlets, moreover, the presence of migrants is said to undermine the perceptions of safety of citizens (11%), who are “exasperated” (MV, 30 December 2016; MP, 14 September 2008) and “afraid” (MV, 1 October 2015; MP, 19 December 2016). In Padova, fears are sensationalised through the use of emotionally-laden adjectives such as feeling “under siege” (MP, 2 October. 2016), “angry and enraged” (MP, 10 August 2008), or “terrified” (MP, 26 September 2011).

Residents in both cities also describe urban neighbourhoods as becoming “of others” – not belonging to “them” anymore (4,1%). Consider, for instance, the following examples: “We are afraid to go out. We do not feel any longer masters in our own house”, MV, 9 January 2017; “There is an attempt of these gangs of drug dealers, mostly Tunisians with residency permits in their pockets, to take control of some neighbourhoods at night, intimidating and frightening the citizens”, MP, 26 September 2011; “The ‘district’ of asylum-seekers”, MP, 25 March 2017; “The piazzas now are scary” MP, 25 June 2011; “They are invading our streets”, MP, 14 September 2016; “We do not longer feel safe in our own homes”, MP, 2 October 2016. This is said to have a negative impact especially on women and children: “The children can no longer play in the park as it became drug dealers’ territory. The girls are harassed, denigrated or insulted when they pass by” (MV, 30 December 2016); “‘They are all men, we – the women – do not feel safe’, said the mums” (MV, 31 May 2015).

Only in a limited number of press news, the problem is associated with terrorism (2.1%) – as a potential crime committed by migrants – and with trafficking in human beings (2.1%) – and the migrants framed as victims.
Solutions

Mostly, the solutions that have been offered in the press in relation to the problem of migrants have to do with the enhanced presence of police officers, and even the army, on the streets (55.9%). In doing so, a sensationalistic and war-type rhetoric is used, as shown for instance by the following fragments:

“We are barricaded in our houses, let the army intervene” (MV, 5 January 2017);
“The station area is secured by dozens of squads” (MV, 15 August 2016);
“It is now war on drug dealing” (MP, 8 September 2015);
“Security emergency. The city has to be militarised” (MP, 28 December 2014).

Examples of successful and praised law enforcement actions are also offered by the news (31.9%):

“The questura, since a long time, was organising ad-hoc services in the station area, with an impressive deployment of manpower. Even more: the questor Claudio Cracovia asked for, and obtained, the intervention of the [. . .] rapid response unit from the Padova police, with agents specialised in public order services, on the streets” (MV, 6 September 2016).
“The other night, 40 law enforcement officers from the questura have hoovered up the hotspots of the city, and they brought 18 people to the questura, including 13 Tunisians, who are considered [as an ethnic group, a.n.] among the most dangerous ones as regards to drug dealing, thefts, and violence” (MP, 1 October 2011).

Typical solutions also include the arrest and conviction of ‘criminal’ migrants (6.7%), the adoption of punitive local regulations entrusting the police with sanctioning powers (6.2%), the shutting down of public spaces like subways and parks (e.g., “The green areas are for the families, not for illegal migrants”, MP, 24 September 2015) and private premises unsuitable for hosting migrants (5.3%), and the ejection and removal of ‘bogus’ and ‘illegal’ migrants (4%). In seven articles (1.7%), moreover, the emphasis is placed on the need to tighten the links between the citizens, the police
and the municipality, with a view to establishing a new ‘partnership in security’ (so-called ‘sicurezza partecipata’, MP, 19 Dec. 2015). Although these solutions are most common for Padova, they also feature in the press debate in Udine.

Responses to the problem of hosting an increasing number of migrants at the local level are the organisation of protests and marches (5,3%), and the transfer of migrants to other locations, including smaller towns (2,4%) and other EU countries (3,8%). Migrants are also to be hosted in dismissed army bases and other allocated places that ought to be refurbished and to comply with health and safety standards (4%), in buildings owned by the church or charities (1,2%), and in privately owned apartments (1%). Also the need for a greater EU intervention (1,4%) and better national coordination (1,4%) are mentioned as solutions.

Other solutions, which have mostly been offered in relation to the migration problem in Udine, are also linked to the redesign and revitalisation of certain city areas (10,8%). Among these measures, there are the installation of CCTV cameras (4,3%), the improvement of the street lightning during the night (2,9%), the amelioration of the street cleaning and of the urban architecture (2,2%), and neighbourhood regeneration (1,4%).

Alongside criminal justice and administrative interventions, therefore, the crime prevention policies promoted in the press news seems to be rooted in situational (Clarke, 1983) and environmental (Newman, 1972; Sorensen et al., 1995) crime prevention. While the former are significantly present in both cities, the latter seems to be only present in Udine, a left-wing territory.

Community (Hope, 1995) crime prevention approaches, including education, integration and job opportunities for migrants, and the organisation of campaigns to sensitise citizens towards accepting and integrating migrants, are identified as solutions only in a minority of articles (5,7%). Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering who speaks in the news and the content of their messages, developmental crime prevention approaches (Tremblay and Craig, 1995), such as interventions for child migrants or second-generation asylum-seekers, are never addressed in the news.

Other solutions include the carrying out of health checks on asylum seekers and undocumented migrants (2,4%), and the fastening of the procedures that award them the refugee status (1,7%).
Concluding thoughts

The ‘problem’ of migrants in Italy has been constructed, both at the national and local levels, as a security problem and has been tackled with public order and ‘crimmigration’ measures. National legislations have been passed by both centre-right and centre-left coalitions mirroring the popular saying among politicians that “the issue of security is neither [a task] of the left nor of the right” (see Pighi, 2014). Security is, in fact, a very appealing topic that helps politicians – of any political colour – to tap into people’s fears and anxieties and gain political consensus. For example, as explained by Colombo (2013), tough ‘crimmigration’ measures in Italy have been passed by both centre-right and centre-left coalitions. Similarly, enhanced security powers to local authorities have been introduced (through the so-called ‘Security Package’ mentioned above) by a centre-right coalition, and have been revamped in 2017 by a law decree (the ‘Minniti’ Decree) of the centre-left government run by PD, and more recently by a ‘security decree’ of the current populist government (a coalition between the 5 Star Movement and the right-wing party Northern League). The use of the banner of security as an electoral tool to gain political consensus has been pursued both by left- and right-wing political parties not only at the national level. At the local level, local authorities have, in practice, tended to enforce crimmigration measures, and to exercise (illegitimate) public order powers, to ultimately please the fearful electorate and maintain or gain political support.8

As emerges from our results, local politicians and law enforcers in Udine and Padova, the cities considered in this study and run by centre-left and right-wing (Northern League) political parties respectively, have con-

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8 There are, of course, a few exceptions, for instance cases where people’s fears have been addressed by local authorities with integration and community-led programmes rather than with more law enforcement. In Riace, a town in the southern region of Calabria, for example, the mayor Mimmo Lucano has introduced a welcoming system for migrants based on their integration in the community. However, with a contested decision occurring in a very difficult and polarized political contest, the mayor has been arrested in early October 2018 and charged with aiding and abetting illegal immigration.
structured the ‘problems’ of migrants in the local press in only slightly different terms: they have described them as disorderly, in Udine, and as criminal and bogus, in Padova – where a more sensationalistic and rhetoric tone has generally been used, also reflecting the political rhetoric of the populist party Northern League running the city. This notwithstanding, they have mainly proposed the same set of solutions: more law enforcement, including the deployment of the army. Since the study found that the local press tends mostly to cover the messages of local politicians and promote their problem-framing and solutions, its results seem to resonate the findings of a recent study of the representations of unauthorised migrants in the Dutch press, which has suggested that the press, rather than framing ‘problems’ and setting agendas for the policy-maker, tend to reflect and follow political debates fuelled by domestic politicians (Brower et al., 2017).

We do not want in any way to downplay the problems that many Italian municipalities are currently facing when it comes to hosting (documented or undocumented) migrants in their territories, which are severe considering the number of migrants that daily arrive in Italy, both by sea and via land. In addition, very few cases of violent and sexual attacks committed by migrants against Italians have actually happened, particularly in Padova. However, such cases have been exploited by local politicians in the press and have been exaggerated/amplified, thus contributing to fuelling people’s fears9 and to constructing migrants as the ‘dangerous other’. The local press construction of migrants as a security problem is worrying especially in light of the 2017 ‘Minniti’ Decree, which allows municipalities to sanction individual’s behaviour when it is deemed to impair the ‘decorum’, ‘urban liveability’ and the “peace and quiet of residents”, and to ban people from certain city areas when their behaviour “impairs the access and use of those areas” by others (see above in the Background section).

Clearly, this Decree is based on very vague notions such as, ‘decorum’, ‘liveability’, ‘peace and quiet’, impairment to ‘access and use’ of city spaces by others, whose meaning is to be given by local authorities and can, in practice, be informed by arbitium (or, as already pointed out by the Constitutional Court in 2011, by not clearly pre-determined criteria valid

9 As pointed out by Lane and Meeker (2003), white people’s fears are mostly affected by newspaper reporting (rather than TV viewing, which has been found to have no effect on fear of crime by Chadee and Ditton, 2005).
for all municipalities that ensure legal certainty). In essence, the simple presence of unwanted migrants in the streets, which may be considered alarming for some (although not actually causing any harm to people in an overwhelmingly majority of cases) can be penalised by local actors through public order and crimmigration measures, which may involve administrative sanctions as well as detention (especially in the case of undocumented migrants). This potentially leads to a net widening effect (Cohen, 1985), as certain individuals – for them belonging to a certain social group rather than for them committing (deviant or) criminal acts – are caught and retained in the net of the criminal justice system.

The local use of punitive measures to criminalise the (disorderly or criminal) migrant ‘other’ may be facilitated by the press coverage of the messages of politicians and law enforcers, who, with their negative portrayal of migrants, dominate the local press news as a kind of ‘deviance-defining élite’ (Erickson et al. in Jewkes, 2015). A very limited coverage is given, by contrast, to the voices of third sector associations, charities and religious groups, who can pass positive messages on migrants and examples of integration, and to the opinion of criminology and criminal justice experts, who can contribute to reframing the popular media constructions of the ‘problem’ and its solutions. Overall, media give very rigid representations of crimes committed by migrants, which is in line with previous research on Greek media (Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2013). Third sector associations and experts – in an effort to enhance the presence of their views in the local press and ensure a greater pluralism in the content of media news – should aim at gaining access to the local press (and, more broadly, to the local media) and regularly make their voice heard on locally relevant news involving migrants. In particular, criminology and criminal justice experts willing to act as ‘public criminologists’ may, for example, benefit from the writings on ‘newsmaking’ (Barak, 1988, 2007) and public criminologies (see, e.g., Loader and Sparks, 2010; Turner, 2013; Crépault, 2017), which may help them to better communicate through media outlets and, ultimately, to ‘correct’ biased or distorted images of ‘criminal’ groups. A more active newsmaking role of criminologist is desired especially considering the media interest in – and concern about –migration, which seems to be ever-growing (Spencer, 2008) and unlikely to decrease in the next years. This is the more important in view of the shared poor understanding
of the issue by key stakeholders, including the (national and local) government(s), law enforcers and the media (Van Duyne, 2004a, 2004b).

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